Abstract The current paper addresses the relationship between trade and endogenous pollution levels, with a focus different from the previous literature. The mechanism linking pollution and trade here is that trade policy provides the home government with a credible threat that helps motivate domestic firms to adopt cleaner technologies. This credible threat comes from the fact that the government has a greater incentive to protect a clean industry than to protect a very polluting one. In that sense, the existence of trade helps reduce domestic pollution compared to what would prevail in a situation of autarky. On the other hand, a commitment to free trade would be counterproductive: it removes the government's ability to credibly threaten lower levels of protection. In fact we show that any trade liberalization hurts the welfare of the home country. In terms of world welfare, moderate trade liberalization is helpful, but only as long as it does not affect the technology choices of the firms. Because committing to lower 'bounded' tariffs limits a government's ability to enforce strict environmental standards, a country that has agreed to tighter tariff limits under the World Trade Organization would, other things equal, be a more likely "pollution haven" than a country with weaker WTO commitments.
Over the last two decades economists and environmentalists have tried to disentangle the complex linkages between environmental and trade policies to assess the likely effects of freer trade on the environment. The environmentalists' great fear is that an expansion of international trade might lead to a systematic increase in pollution through an increase in economic activity, the location choices of multinational corporations and/or the weakening of national environmental policies. These concerns are the subject of a large economics literature. 1 Our paper also addresses the relationship between trade and endogenous pollution levels, but we take a different perspective. Rather than ask how more trade is likely to affect the environment, we ask what the effects of a commitment to free trade would be. We do this in a partial equilibrium model with local pollution. As several of the more polluting industries (e.g. mining, chemicals) are best characterized as oligopolies, models of trade that allow for market power appear especially well-suited to this kind of analysis.
Many papers examine the strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms and governments in an international context. Spencer and Brander (1983) , Brander and Spencer(1983) and Eaton and Grossman (1986) show how governments can improve national welfare by committing to trade policies that modify the strategic interaction between firms. In such models, where policies are set before firms make their own choices, governments essentially 'lend' their commitment power to their home firms, helping them to ensure a more advantageous position. This type of model has also been used to discuss how environmental policies can affect the competitiveness of home firms (see Conrad (1993) , Barrett(1994) , Kennedy (1994) and Ulph (1996) ). We depart from this traditional approach by assuming that governments have limited commitment power. More precisely, as is traditional, we consider a simple game where governments can choose their trade policies before firms choose their output levels, but we also allow the firms to choose the type of production technology that they will use before trade policies are set. The main rationale for this is that technology adoption can be argued to be less easily reversible than trade policy choices. In that sense, our timing is similar to the model of Brander and Spencer (1987) , where multinational firms choose whether to serve a market through exports or foreign direct investment before the host government can commit to levels of trade protection or local taxation. 1 Papers on the topic differ mostly according to whether pollution is strictly local or spills across borders, whether firms are allowed to choose an abatement technology, whether the location of production is endogenous, and according to the set of policy tools considered. See Taylor (1994 and and Grossman and Krueger (1991) for seminal contributions in a general equilibrium framework. For partial equilibrium analysis, see Markusen et al. (1995) , who examine the location decision of (polluting) firms as well as Conrad (1993) , Barret (1994) and Kennedy (1994) , where environmental policies are used to affect the international competitiveness of local firms. See Karp et al. (2001) for a recent review of the literature.
In our model, the mechanism linking pollution and trade is that trade provides the home government with a credible threat that helps motivate domestic firms to adopt cleaner technologies. 2 This credible threat comes from the fact that the government has a greater incentive to protect a clean industry than to protect a polluting one. Unless the government controls other perfectly efficient instruments to affect the firms' technological choices, this threat is useful. In that sense, the existence of trade helps reduce domestic pollution compared to what would prevail in a situation of autarky. On the other hand, a commitment to free trade would be counterproductive: it removes the government's credibility to threaten lower levels of protection and, therefore, decreases the domestic firms' incentives to invest in cleaner production methods.
Extending our analysis to allow for emission taxes, we find that a commitment to free trade can again limit a country's ability to enforce tough pollution standards. Under free trade, imposing high emission taxes on the domestic firms puts them at a competitive disadvantage with respect to their foreign rivals. Under managed trade, this competitive handicap can be alleviated by taxing imports of foreign goods.
We therefore conclude that committing to lower tariff bounds limits a country's ability to enforce tough standards for local pollution. In that sense, we would expect countries with stricter WTO commitments to be more likely pollution havens than countries that retain considerable discretion in setting up their trade barriers.
This basic mechanism described above is analysed in the simplest possible twocountry partial equilibrium game. It is presented in section 1, where we show how ex post trade policy provides incentives to invest in pollution-reducing technologies. The effect of trade liberalization on home and world welfare is analysed in sections 2 and 3. Section 4 discusses the robustness of our results and a few extensions. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We consider two countries, 'Home' and 'Foreign'. Each country has one firm that produces in its country of origin. The home firm is indexed as firm 1, while firm 2 is the foreign firm. These firms sell a homogenous good that can be produced at a constant marginal (and average) cost of c, which we will set equal to zero. Firms compete in quantities. Two production technologies are available, one clean, one dirty. The dirty technology generates local pollution, while the clean technology does not. The welfare cost of this pollution is proportional to local output, i.e. the social cost pollution at Home is: q 1 if the home firm uses the dirty technology 0 if the home firm adopts the clean technology, where q 1 is the output of the home firm and 0. We assume that the home firm is initially endowed with the dirty technology but can adopt the clean technology at a fixed cost of F.
In order to concentrate on the new effect presented in this paper, we assume that the choice of technology does not affect the marginal cost of production. If it did, then policies aimed at reducing production would also affect the reaction function of the domestic firm. Such well-known 'strategic trade' effects would make computations messier without adding anything new to the analysis.
We will focus on the home market where the inverse demand for the homogenous good takes the simplest possible linear form:
where Q = q 1 + q 2 is total industry output and P is the price in the domestic market.
Trade policy takes the form of a unit tariff t. We assume that the home country is the only one with an active trade policy.
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The benchmark is a situation where the home country is free to set its tariff at any level that it pleases. In such a 'freely managed trade' regime, the timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage the domestic firm must decide whether to keep its current polluting technology or to adopt the new, cleaner technology. Once the adoption decision is made, the home government chooses the level of its import tariff. In a third stage, firms simultaneously choose their levels of output. As discussed in the introduction, the order of the three stages reflects the assumption that the government has only limited commitment power: while it might be able to commit to a specific level of tariff before firms actually compete in the product market, the choice of tariff is more easily reversible than the firm's choice of technology.
5 This timing also rules out 'contingent' trade policies, whereby the government commits to tariff levels that explicitly depend on the adoption decisions of the domestic firms. The game is solved for its unique sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Starting from the managed trade benchmark, we then consider the effects of 'trade liberalization', which is modelled as a legally binding upper limit on the level of tariff that the government can choose in stage 2. We also consider the extreme case of a commitment to free trade, where the home government completely forgo the use of trade policy. This means that t = 0 even if the optimal tariff t* were to be negative 3 We can either assume that the firms are only active in the Home market or that they are active in both markets but hold 'segmented markets' perceptions, i.e. each firm perceives each country as a separate market and makes distinct quantity decisions for each. Together with our assumption of constant unit costs, the segmented perception assumption would allow us to treat the two markets independently. 4 See Gallegos (2003) for a discussion of the case with two active governments. As this extension does not add any significant new insight, it is omitted here. 5 A similar timing can be found in Brander and Spencer (1987) 's analysis of foreign direct investment.
(which would occur for >1). In this case, the second stage of the game becomes irrelevant. 6 For both versions of the model, we solve the game by starting with the final stage (given t of stage 2). The equilibrium quantities of the two firms in the third stage of the game are easily obtained as: where t is the per unit import tariff chosen by the home government in stage 2. To ensure an interior solution, we need -1 < t < ½. The corresponding tariff revenue is:
The equilibrium profit of the domestic firm, 1 , domestic consumer surplus CS, and domestic welfare W are:
We can now consider the second stage of the game. Under freely managed trade, the optimal tariff is obtained by maximizing W with respect to t. This yields:
In the absence of pollution, this tariff is positive.
7 Crucially for our argument, the chosen tariff is inversely related to the pollution parameter . For the domestic firm, this means that adopting a cleaner technology is "rewarded" by stronger ex post protection. As the domestic firm anticipates this reward, the home country's ability to choose its trade policy ex post increases the domestic firm's incentive to invest in the new technology in stage 1. This is confirmed by substituting the expression for the optimal tariff into the equilibrium profits of the home firm:
The domestic firm's incentives to invest in the non-polluting technology are therefore given by:
where (0) is the firm's profit when it has chosen the clean technology. It is useful to replace t by its optimal value in a number of other variables. We get: To ensure interior solutions, we assume that < 4. Notice that, under this assumption, B 1 is always positive. Hence, the ex post tariff policy that emerges under 'managed trade' provides the domestic firm with greater incentives to invest in the cleaner technology than if the home government had committed to free trade. Under free trade, the domestic firm has no incentive to adopt the less polluting technology: adoption is costly and offers no benefit since the ex post tariff is set equal to zero anyway.
The range of investment costs for which the technology would be adopted under managed trade corresponds to all positive values lower than B 1 , as shown on Figure 1 .
Let us now consider the effect of less extreme trade liberalization. Define the maximum tariff allowed as t . Clearly, liberalization has no effect if it is not binding, 
Home Country's Welfare
The fact that private incentives to choose cleaner technologies are enhanced by managed trade does not of course guarantee that these technological choices are optimal from the point of view of the home country. To compare private and social incentives to adopt the cleaner technology, we must compare B 1 to the change in the home country's welfare that is triggered by a move to the new technology. This change is given by:
where x refers to the difference between the value of x when the clean technology is adopted -and the tariff set accordingly -and the value of x when the firm chooses to use the dirty technology. The first term represents the effect on consumer surplus. This is unambiguously negative as the adoption of a cleaner technology leads to greater levels of protection and, therefore, a higher domestic price. The last term corresponds to the decrease in pollution levels and is therefore positive. The third term represents the firm's private incentives to adopt the cleaner technology (i.e. it is equal to B 1 ). As we have just seen, this is positive. Anyway, as -F is fully taken into account by the domestic firm, these terms do not affect a comparison of private and social incentives. Finally, the change in tariff revenues can a priori be either positive or negative.
Our interest lies in the difference between W and B 1 :
which is positive for all relevant values of the pollution parameter (i.e. < 4), and negative for high values of . This means that F has values for which adoption of the clean technology is desirable but does not happen, but no values for which socially undesirable adoption is observed. This is shown in Figure 2 and summarised in proposition 2. , would force the country to set a sub-optimal tariff ex post, lowering its welfare. We must now examine whether trade liberalization could help by changing the technological choice of the domestic firm. From proposition 1 we know that trade liberalization cannot increase the firm's incentives to adopt the clean technology. Hence we only need to analyse the case where the firm would adopt under freely managed trade but would not after trade has been liberalized. Define the level of tariff below which the firm ceases to invest in the clean technology as t c . Let us then assume that c t < t*( ) so that freely managed trade would ensure adoption of the clean technology and consider a trade liberalization that would reverse this technological choice, i.e. < t t c . Since the firm already has insufficient incentives to invest under freely managed trade, such liberalization can only be welfare decreasing: the country reacts to any tariff bound just below the critical level t c by choosing its optimal 'no adoption' ex post tariff 3 / ) 1 ( = t . As 1 B W > 0, we know that this yields a level of welfare that is lower than when the country can induce adoption and set its ex post tariff equal to 1/3. Hence we can state:
Proposition 3: In this model, trade liberalization can never increase domestic welfare.
The evolution of domestic welfare as the maximum allowed tariff is lowered is summarized in Figure 3 .
Figure 3a
Figure 3a corresponds to an initial situation of insufficient adoption (region A in Figure 2 ). As explained above, trade liberalization has no effect on the home country's welfare until the maximum tariff reaches 3 / ) 1 ( . Further liberalization beyond this point decreases welfare. Figure 3b is drawn for an initial point in region B of Figure 2 . As soon as liberalization becomes binding, it decreases home welfare. This decrease continues up to the point where the firm no longer adopts the clean technology. At this point, welfare can in principle jump up or down. This depends on whether welfare without adoption and an optimal ex post tariff of 3 / ) 1 ( is higher or lower than welfare with adoption an a constrained tariff equal to t c . If welfare jumps up, we still know that it remains lower than without trade liberalization: in region B adoption with an unconstrained tariff is better than no adoption with an unconstrained tariff. Further liberalization does not affect welfare until t reaches 3 / ) 1 ( , at which point further decreases in t decrease welfare.
Figure 3b
While we have focused on the issue of trade liberalization, it should be clear that, in our model, autarky is never optimal either. To see this, notice that autarky, just like trade with t t c , never induces adoption of the clean technology. With no adoption, the home country does best by setting its ex post optimal tariff of 3 / ) 1 ( . As this tariff is not prohibitive, it must, by definition, yield higher home welfare than does autarky. Hence, some amount of trade liberalization is always preferable to autarky. A similar argument holds when adoption would occur under freely managed trade and would be socially optimal (region B in Figure 2 ): if managed trade is better than the best possible regime without adoption, and adoption is desirable, then managed trade must be better than autarky. 
World Welfare
World welfare differs from the home country's welfare in two respects: it includes the profits of the foreign firm as well as the pollution associated with foreign production. Because of this last term, we cannot evaluate world welfare without making some assumption about the technology used by the foreign firm. In the first part of this section, we simply assume that the foreign firm is using the clean technology, so that foreign pollution is not an issue. In the second part, we look at the opposite case where the foreign firm uses the dirty technology, so that foreign pollution further complicates the analysis.
'Clean' Foreign Firm
Adoption of the clean technology by the home firm leads to higher tariff levels ex post, thereby reducing the equilibrium profits of the foreign firm. Since these profits are the difference between world welfare and home welfare, adoption must be less desirable from the world point of view than from the viewpoint of the home country alone. Therefore we cannot a priori rule out values of the parameters for which the domestic firm's private decision to adopt the clean technology might actually reduce world welfare, defined as W w . We are interested in the difference between the effect of the adoption of the clean technology by domestic firm on world welfare, W w , and its effect on the domestic firm' s profit, B 1 :
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Since this expression is positive for all 4, the firm's incentives to adopt cannot ever be excessive from the point of view of world welfare.
'Dirty' Foreign Firm
If the foreign firm relies on a dirty technology, then adoption of the clean technology by the home firm has an additional positive effect on world welfare. Adoption results in higher tariffs. These higher tariffs reduce the output of the foreign firm and the corresponding foreign pollution. Since incentives to adopt were already insufficient in the presence of a 'clean' foreign firm, they still are when the foreign firm itself contributes to overall pollution. The qualitative effect of trade liberalization on world welfare does not depend on whether the foreign firm pollutes. The general pattern is shown in Figure 4 . We focus on the non-trivial case where the domestic firm would adopt the clean technology under freely managed trade. That is, we assume that the adoption cost F is small enough that ) 0 ( and world welfare is independent of t over this range. With further liberalization, the home country's ex post tariff is now constrained by t . Hence any decrease in this upper bound translates into a decrease in the equilibrium tariff, increasing world welfare.
We must still discuss the relative 'height' of the segments of the welfare function to the right and to the left of c t in Figure 4 . From proposition 5, we know that , whenever adoption occurs and the home country's optimal ex post tariff is chosen This means that the horizontal segment to the right of c t must lie higher than the horizontal segment to the left. On the other hand, the relative position of the rightmost horizontal segment and the level of welfare under free trade is not clear a priori. To rank these, we take the technology of the foreign firm as given. Hence, the only relevant fixed costs of adoption are those relating to the technological choice of the home firm. Our analysis of 'world welfare' relies on a very partial equilibrium exercise: there is only one active market and one active government. Allowing for two active governments and two active markets does not change matters very much. Under our assumptions of constant cost, segmented market perception and local pollution, the ex post optimal tariffs of the two active governments are independent of each other and are exactly the same as the optimal tariff in our 'one market/one government framework'. Furthermore, the adoption decision of a given firm is itself independent of the policy of the foreign government and of the adoption choice of its foreign rival. The only significant difference concerns the impact of adoption on world welfare. The presence of two markets increases output levels, making pollution reduction more socially desirable for any level of fixed investment cost F. As private incentives to invest do not change, this means that they are even more insufficient in the full twocountry framework. A more complete discussion of the case with two active governments and two markets can be found in the Appendix.
Discussion and Robustness
Our analysis suggests that governments might actually gain from retaining some discretion over their trade policies. This contrasts with a significant body of work that 9 Comparing the two expressions, we see that welfare under freely managed trade dominates welfare under free trade iff F < ((18+3 )/9. We then use the fact that the home firm adopts under freely managed trade so that shows that international trade agreements can be useful precisely because they remove discretion from individual governments. 10 This striking difference arises because of a restriction that we impose on the class of agreements that can be reached. In our framework, trade liberalization simply imposes an upper bound on tariffs. We do not allow these upper bounds to be conditional on the technology choices of home firms. If we did, then ex ante agreements to liberalize trade would be at least as effective as freely managed trade. While trade agreements could in principle accommodate such contingent tariff bounds, they do not seem to do so in practice, suggesting that such 'contracts' might be prohibitively costly to enforce.
In the rest of the section, we briefly discuss the robustness of our results to four kinds of extensions: more firms, more general demands, other models of oligopoly, and the availability of other policy instruments.
More Firms, More General Demands, and Other Models of Oligopoly
The conclusion that the domestic firms' incentives to adopt the clean technology are larger under freely managed trade than under free trade (or partial liberalization) holds under quite general conditions. Define i as firm i's pollution parameter. Firm i's incentives to clean up its technology is determined by:
reflecting the fact that firm i's technological choice only affects its profits through its effect on the ex post optimal tariff. As we can see, our main result depends on two effects. Firstly we need an increase in the cleanliness of firm i's technology to result in a higher ex post tariff (i.e. dt*/d i < 0) . Let us write the country's welfare as
where n f is the number of foreign firms, n is the number of domestic firms and i is the degree of dirtiness of firm i's technology. The value of t* is therefore determined by
where a prime refers to a first order derivative. Hence, 10 See, for example, Staiger and Tabellini (1989) , where trade agreements help the policy-maker solve his own time inconsistency problem, and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) , where trade agreements 'save' the policy-maker from domestic lobbies.
which is negative in all models of oligopoly where a firm's output expands when some of its rivals are hit by a per unit tax.
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The second effect that we need in order to reach our conclusion is simply that the domestic firm benefits from a higher tariff (i.e. d i /dt* > 0) . As a tariff just shifts the residual demand of the domestic industry out, this effect arises in every common model of oligopolistic competition.
The precise welfare results that we obtain are much less robust. They might well change if different functional forms were used. Crucially we cannot be certain that the domestic firm's incentives to adopt the new technology will always fall short of the associated benefits for its home country or for the world as a whole. If they did not, then a range of parameters exists for which adoption would occur even though it would not be welfare maximising. In such a case one can show that trade liberalization that is drastic enough to discourage adoption would in fact increase welfare. Moreover such a 'drastic' level of trade liberalization would always exist. This argument is sketched briefly below.
Suppose that, with different functional forms, we obtained a range of parameters for which the domestic firm would adopt the clean technology even though home welfare would be higher if it stuck with the dirty technology. The effect of trade liberalization on the welfare of the home country could then be represented in Figure  5 . The graph is similar to Figure 3b , so is the reasoning involved.
Starting from unrestricted managed trade, a progressive tightening of t , leaves home welfare unchanged until it reaches the ex post optimal tariff given that the cleaner technology has been adopted, defined as t n * (i.e. 1/3 in our linear demand example). For t between c t and t n *, adoption still takes place but the home country cannot set its preferred tariff ex post. Hence home welfare decreases. As in Figure 4b . trade liberalization that moves t below c t prevents the adoption of the new technology. Since technology adoption was undesirable even if the tariff could be set at t n *, avoiding adoption when the tariff is capped below t n * must increase domestic welfare. Moreover, domestic welfare must jump to a level that is higher than when t t n *. Domestic welfare remains at this level as long as t remains higher than the ex post optimal tariff in the absence of adoption, defined as t o * (equal to 3 / ) 1 ( in our linear example). Tightening the tariff cap beyond this level is again welfare decreasing. Overall then, the home country' s welfare is maximised by committing to a tariff cap that lies between t o * and c t . We can then conclude that when freely managed trade results in undesirable adoption of the new technology, moderate trade liberalization -sufficient to prevent adoption but leaving the country free to set its ex post optimal tariff -unambiguously increases the home country's welfare.
Figure 5
Essentially, trade liberalization helps the home country credibly commit not to 'reward' the home firm for the adoption of the new technology. Incentives to adopt disappear at a tariff rate that is above the ex post optimal tariff rate without adoption, so a suitable tariff cap can eliminate undesirable adoption without affecting the level of domestic welfare in the non-adoption outcome.
Subsidizing Adoption of the Clean Technology
As presented, the analysis is obviously vulnerable to the introduction of other policy instruments. In fact, a government who could commit to paying a lump sum subsidy S to domestic firms adopting the clean technology and who could finance this costlessly would always be able to induce adoption of the clean technology whenever this is socially desirable. On the other hand, unless lump sum taxes on pollutionreducing investments were also contemplated (which seems politically difficult), the government would not be able to avoid excessive adoption. In that case, as we have just seen, trade liberalization would remain useful.
More importantly, subsidies cannot usually be financed costlessly. If one assumes that each unit of subsidy involves a social cost of (1+µ), with µ 0, then our analysis remains quite relevant. As the subsidy is now costly, the government will choose the smallest possible subsidy that induces the desirable adoption behaviour.
Hence the optimal size of the subsidy depends precisely on the type of analysis that we have conducted. Referring to Figure 2 , any parameter combination in region B would call for S = 0. As the change in the ex post optimal tariff suffices to induce the (desirable) adoption of the clean technology and the ex post optimal tariff t n * = 1/3 will be imposed whether or not subsidies are given, using subsidies would be a waste of resources. For any combination of parameters in region A , the only sensible subsidy is one that is just sufficient to induce adoption given the reward that will be granted anyway through the optimal post-adoption increase in tariff, i.e.
S = F -B 1
If µ is small enough, then this subsidy should indeed be used. For µ large enough, the home country is better off relying exclusively on the ex post tariff mechanism that we have analysed.
Emission Taxes
Emission taxes are natural instruments to handle pollution. One can therefore wonder whether the benefits of freely managed trade survive once such taxes are introduced.
12 To be consistent with our assumption about the government's ability to commit, we assume that the emission taxes are set after the domestic firm has chosen its technology. The tax is simply proportional to the firm's emissions, i.e. tax revenues E are given by:
is the tax rate.
To assess the effect of freely managed trade on the domestic firm's incentives to adopt the clean technology, we must obtain the value of B 1 = 1 ( =0) -1 ( ) when both instruments can be used an compare it to the value of B 1 when the government has committed to free trade. The profit functions of the two firms are given by:
In the third stage of the game, the firms choose their respective output simultaneously, yielding the following equilibrium quantities; As emission taxes are a transfer between domestic firms and the home government, domestic welfare can be written as:
Using the equilibrium values of the firms' outputs and maximizing W with respect to both t and , we obtain the following first order conditions:
One can see immediately that the two policy instruments are complementary: the higher t, the higher . Solving the first order conditions yields the following optimal values for the policy instruments and the corresponding level of domestic welfare: The introduction of emission taxes dramatically affects the optimal ex post tariff. In particular, the tariff is now increasing in so that a clean domestic firm receives less protection than a dirty one. However, this does not mean that freely managed trade necessarily reduces the firm's incentive to adopt the abatement technology. To assess this we must compare the firm's incentives to invest under free trade and freely managed trade. Using the expressions for the optimal policies and for the equilibrium quantities, we can derive the home firm's incentive to invest under freely managed trade:
We now assume that the home country is committed to free trade so that t = 0. Maximizing W with respect to only, we get * = 2. Substituting this into the equilibrium values of q 1 and q 2 and plugging these back into firm 1's profit function, we get the home firm's incentive to adopt:
Comparing the two expression, we find that B 1a > B 1f , i.e. incentives to invest in the abatement technology are still larger under freely managed trade. The intuition for this result is readily obtained by comparing the equilibrium value of the emission tax under the two trade regimes. Under free trade, the policy-maker has to weigh two opposing effects 13 : a higher tax reduces pollution, but it also reduces the home firm's competitiveness with respect to the foreign firm. On the other hand, when an active trade policy is feasible, the tariff can be used to preserve the competitive balance, allowing for more aggressive emission taxes. In other words, it is precisely because the two policy tools are complement that incentives to adopt the clean technology are once again higher under freely managed trade than under free trade.
Pollution Havens
Firms may migrate to countries with low pollution standards. This migration is facilitated by free trade since other markets can then be served more easily from a few 'pollution-tolerant' bases. Traditionally, countries are thought to be potential pollution havens if their policy-makers put a lower weight on the disutility from pollution than their trading partners. Such differences can in turn be linked to differences in tastes or income across countries or to differences in political institutions. If, for example, 'clean air' is a normal good, then countries with lower levels of income will have lower pollution standards and attract more producers. Alternatively, a country is more likely to be a pollution haven if its government is heavily influenced by business interests.
Our analysis suggests that, ceteris paribus, countries that have stricter World Trade Organization (WTO) bounds on their tariffs are also more likely to emerge as pollution havens. This is because, for given preferences with respect to pollution, such countries are less able to enforce strict pollution standards than countries that retain more control over their trade policy. 14 Since countries with the tighter WTO commitments also tend to have higher income and -possibly -more representative political institutions, the implication of our model is perfectly compatible with the observation that countries with lesser WTO commitments seem, on average, to also have lower pollution standards.
Conclusion
The main point of this paper is very simple. In the presence of local pollution, a home government will protect its industry from foreign competition more if its domestic firms use a clean production technology. The anticipation of this ex post optimal trade policy gives domestic firms incentives to adopt clean(er) technologies in the first place. The ability to set an unconstrained tariff ex post is therefore valuable as an instrument to foster pollution-reducing investments. Countries that enter binding agreements limiting their ability to set tariffs might therefore lose a valuable tool to protect their environment. In that sense, a commitment to free trade can hurt the environment.
Whether the use of ex post tariffs provides adequate incentives for the adoption of cleaner technologies is less clear. With linear demand and Cournot duopoly, we show that the incentives provided are in fact insufficient. It follows that a commitment to trade liberalization never increases domestic (or world) welfare. In fact, trade liberalization that is drastic enough unambiguously decreases the welfare of the home country. In a more general setting, one cannot rule out the possibility that ex post tariffs provide domestic firms with excessive incentives to clean up their act. In such a case moderate trade liberalization increases the home country's welfare.
Appendix: Two Active Governments and Two Markets
We now briefly consider the case where both firms sell in both markets and both governments have an active trade policy. This does not affect the previous analysis much. The reason for this is that the trade policy of a government does not have any direct influence on the technology adoption decision of a foreign firm. In fact, what a firm produces at home in order to sell it in the foreign market does not affect the trade policy of either of the two governments. The foreign government does not care because the associated pollution does not occur in its own market. The firm's own government does not care either because its domestic trade policy can only affect how much the home firm sells in the home market. Production for sale abroad does generate local pollution, but there is nothing that the government can do about it when setting its ex post optimal tariff. Hence, as can readily be shown, each government's ex post optimal trade policy is exactly the same as in the one country case.
Turning to the first stage of the game, there is now a simultaneous adoption game between the domestic and foreign firms. The payoffs of the two firms for this game are shown in Table 1 below. While the payoffs that accrue to each firm depends on the adoption decisions of the other firm, the difference between a firm's payoff if it adopts and its payoff if it does not is independent of the other firm's technological choice. In fact, as shown in the last line of the table, a firm's incentives to adopt the new technology ( B 1 ) are exactly the same as in our one country/one active government analysis. Hence a firm's own adoption decision does not depend on the action of its rival and the adoption decision is the same as in the one country case. Still, two differences with respect to the 'one country' analysis might be worth mentioning:
1. Scale Effect. Private incentives to adopt are even more likely to be socially insufficient in a two-country framework. The private incentives to adopt (i.e. B 1 ) are still exactly the same since adoption by firm i only affects its profits in its home market. On the other hand, the social benefits of pollution are now greater since, if the firm sticks to the dirty technology, pollution is augmented by the domestic firm's sales in the foreign market.
2. Adoption Externality. From the point of view of country A, local adoption of clean technology is more desirable if the local output is large. The size of the local output depends on the adoption decision of the foreign firm. If the foreign firm adopts the clean technology then B's tariffs will be high so that the total local output of A's own domestic firm will be low. In other words, adoption becomes less desirable for country A when adoption occurs in country B and vice-versa. Since trade policies and adoption decisions are the same as in the one country case, and the firms' incentives to adopt are still (even more) socially insufficient, this effect is of little consequence.
